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I. INTRODUCTION
I first became familiar with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,' when I began teaching
employment law a few years after the decision was issued. Having
spent six years in Illinois while attending law school and graduate
school, and returning to teach at Chicago-Kent College Law, the case
was of particular interest to me, as the names and location of the case
all seemed so familiar. I found the dissent by Justice Antonin Scalia
particularly interesting in that it raised a number of fascinating issues
and made various assertions that seemed to make sense. To be sure,
there were other aspects of his opinion that were not entirely
convincing and other sections which were, honestly, difficult for me to
understand.
This essay summarizes Justice Scalia's dissent and comments on
some of the assertions that I found interesting over twenty years ago.
* James E. Campbell Missouri Endowed Professor of Law, Director Center for the Study
of Dispute Resolution, University of Missouri School of Law.
1. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
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II. THE DECISION

Rutan involved a challenge to various employment practices of
the Republican Party and the Illinois Governor. In 1980, thenGovernor James Thompson, instituted through executive order a
hiring freeze affecting every organization under his control.2 The
executive order provided, however, for possible exceptions to the
freeze with "express permission" from the Governor's office. 3 These
requests had become routine, to the point that an agency was created
within the Governor's office to handle them. The complaint alleged
that in reviewing requests for exceptions to the freeze, the Governor's
Office would look at whether the applicant previously voted in
Republican primaries, had provided financial support to the
Republican Party, had promised to join or work on behalf of the
Republican Party, and whether the applicant had the support of local
Republican party officials.4 The plaintiffs alleged that the Governor
had been using the office to "operate a political patronage system"
for the benefit of individuals who supported and were supported by
the Republican Party.'
In two prior cases, Elrod v. Burns 6 and Branti v. Finkel,7 the
Court had dealt with similar issues. In Elrod, a group of non-civil
service employees brought suit against a newly elected Democratic
sheriff, alleging that their termination amounted to a violation of
their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.' The employees'
dismissals resulted from their lack of affiliation with the Democratic
party. 9 Addressing the constitutionality of patronage dismissals, a
divided Court held that patronage violates the First Amendment
because it restrains a public employee's freedom of political belief
and association.o The Court adopted a categorical approach to
2. Id. at 65.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 66.
5. Id.
6. 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion).
7. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
8. 427 U.S. at 349-50.
9. Id. at 351.
10. Id. at 372-73. The government offered three defenses for its use of patronage. First, the
government cited the need for effective governance of the workplace and efficient employees.
Id. at 364. The Court rejected that justification, arguing instead that the "wholesale replacement
of large numbers of public employees every time political office changes hands" created
inefficiencies equal to or greater than those caused by retention of employees who do not share
political affiliation with the governing party. Id. Second, the government argued that patronage
was vital to the democratic process because it ensured the vitality of political parties and, hence,
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patronage cases to separate those positions of public employment
that can be subject to patronage from those that cannot."
Recognizing that when there is a change in political administrations,
newly elected officials need to bring in their own people to help
implement political policies, the Court held that policymaking
positions are the only positions subject to patronage dismissals. In
Branti, the Court adhered to the categorical approach, but rejected
strict adherence to the policymaking label as the means of applying
the Elrod test.13 Instead, the Court pointed out that the ultimate
question is "whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective
performance of the public office involved." 14 The question raised in
Rutan, thus, was whether the holdings in Elrod and Branti should be
extended to other employment decisions.
Reversing in part the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court in Rutan held that the
rationale advanced in Elrod and Branti against patronage firing,
applied with equal force to promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring
decisions, when those decisions were made on the basis of the party
affiliation of those affected by the decisions." The Court held that the
state had failed to advance a compelling reason which justified
interfering with the plaintiffs' freedom to "believe or associate, or to
not believe and not associate." 1 6

the two-party system. Id. at 368. The Court summarily dismissed this argument, commenting
that the elimination of patronage would not bring about the demise of party politics. Id. at 36869. Finally, the government raised a loyalty argument by arguing that patronage was necessary
to ensure that employees would not undermine the implementation of new policies sanctioned
by the electorate. Id. at 367. While somewhat sympathetic to this argument, the Court found
that it did not validate the need for patronage in all cases. Instead, the Court argued that
limiting patronage to policymaking positions was sufficient to achieve governmental ends. Id.
11. Id. at 367-68.
12. See id. at 367. The Court reasoned that "[n]onpolicymaking individuals usually have
only limited responsibility and are therefore not in a position to thwart the goals of the inparty." Id. The Court was not completely clear on how to distinguish policymaking from
nonpolicymaking positions. See id. Justice Brennan acknowledged that while "no clear line can
be drawn between policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions," courts should consider the
nature of an employee's responsibilities and whether the same include acting as an adviser or
formulating plans for the implementation of broad goals. See id. at 367-68.
13. Brand v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
14. Id.
15. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990).
16. Id. at 76.

166

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol.21:163

III. SCALIA'S DISSENT

Justice Scalia's twenty-five-page dissenting opinion is divided
into three parts and starts with a short introduction. In the
introduction, Scalia laid out his basic disagreement with the majority
opinion. After characterizing the majority's test as "the constitutional
principle that party membership is not a permissible factor in the
dispensation of government jobs, except those jobs for the
performance of which party affiliation is an 'appropriate
requirement,"' Scalia noted, "[i]t is hard to say precisely (or even
generally) what that exception means."" He then criticized the
majority's willingness to make "its constitutional civil service reform
absolute" by extending the prohibition involving firings from Elrod
and Branti to employment decisions involving hirings and
promotions." Finally, he warned the Court about the "disastrous
consequences" that the holding would have for the political system,
not before sardonically taunting the majority for announcing and
enforcing "the constitutional principle that party membership is not a
permissible factor in the dispensation of government jobs," when the
Justices themselves "overwhelmingly owe their office to its
violation." 19
In Part I of his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia discussed the
framework he believed appropriate for analyzing the government's
actions in this case. He first noted that the Constitution places
different restrictions on government depending on whether it is
regulating private conduct, or acting as an employer.20 He cited as
examples cases like O'Connorv. Ortega,21 involving property searches
in public workplaces, and Connick v. Myers,22 involving free speech
issues for public employees.
With that basic premise laid down, Scalia proceeded to explore
whether the employment practice involved in Rutan, that is,
patronage-based employment decisions, was permissible. In his view,
where a practice is not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of
Rights, the question becomes whether the practice enjoys "a long

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 97 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 98.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 94.
480 U.S. 7009 (1987) (plurality opinion).
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use."23 If so, noted
Justice Scalia, the Court has "no proper basis for striking it down." 24
Scalia believed that in this case, that inquiry did not present "a
difficult question,"25 because unlike some other employment
practices, patronage clearly had that "landmark status." 2 6 As
supporting evidence, he referred to Justice Powell's dissenting
opinions in Branti and Elrod and to three academic writings.27 In
addition, and somewhat defensively, in a footnote, Justice Scalia
responded to the possible argument of invoking Brown v. Board of
Education, "as demonstrating the dangerous consequences" of the
constitutional interpretation principle he was proposing. Scalia
argued the reference to Brown was unsupportable because unlike the
practice of patronage, "a tradition of unchallenged validity did not
exist with respect to the practice in Brown."29
In Part II of his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia criticized the
majority's decision to evaluate the government's actions in this case
under a strict scrutiny standard. Scalia made two key points. First, he
argued that it would be more appropriate to evaluate the government
conduct using a rational basis test.30 Second, he argued that the
government would clearly meet the rational basis level of scrutiny
with regard to the practice of patronage.31
As to the first issue, Scalia reiterated the point he made earlier,
that different standards apply to the government when it acts as an
employer as opposed to when it attempts to regulate private
conduct.3 2 The argument in this section centered around the issue of
whether in evaluating speech restrictions on employees in cases like
33
Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers,
Public Works v.
34
35
Mitchell, Pickering v. Board of Education, and Connick, the Court
had applied the strict scrutiny or the rational basis test. Justice Scalia

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Rutan, 497 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 96.
Id.
Id. at 95 n.1 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
Id.
Id. at 98-102.
Id. at 102-10.
Id. at 98.
413 U.S. 548 (1973).
330 U.S. 75 (1947).
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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argued that in those cases the Court did not apply the "normal" strict
scrutiny test that the Court would traditionally apply in cases
involving government regulation of speech.36 For example, with
regard to Mitchell, Justice Scalia noted that in upholding the
provisions of the Hatch Act prohibiting political activities by federal
employees, the Court only required a showing that the law was
intended to regulate "'an act reasonably deemed by Congress to
interfere with the efficiency of the public service."' 37 Justice Scalia
also cited to cases like Pickering and Connick as fodder for his
argument that the Court had held previously that "government
employment decisions taken on the basis of an employee's speech
[are unconstitutional] merely because they fail the narrow-tailoring
and compelling-interest tests applicable to direct regulation of
speech." 38 Scalia noted that the Court had given government "a wide
degree of deference" in deciding whether speech by employees
interfered with government's ability to function as an employer.39
In a long footnote, Justice Scalia responded to a criticism levied
by the majority.40 In the majority opinion, Justice Brennan had
criticized Scalia's opinion on two grounds. First, the majority referred
to Justice Scalia's analysis as "questionable" given that the cases that
Scalia described did in fact apply strict scrutiny.41 Second, Justice
Brennan also noted that the governmental interests that Justice Scalia
argued were furthered by the practice of patronage, were not
interests that the government exercised in its capacity as employer,
but interests that the government "might have in the structure and
functioning of society as a whole."42 As to the former criticism, Justice
Scalia characterized the majority's assertion as incorrect and
unhelpful. He also dramatically argued that if the majority was
correct and that those cases indeed applied strict scrutiny, then "the
so-called 'strict scrutiny' test means nothing." 4 3 As to the latter,
Justice Scalia basically argued that there was no distinction between
interest of government "as an employer" and "in the structure and
functioning of society as a whole," and even if those were different,
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Rutan, 497 U.S. at 100 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 98 (quoting Mitchell, 220 U.S. at 101).
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 100 n.3.
Id. at 70 n.4 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 100 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Having concluded that strict scrutiny was not required, Justice
Scalia then discussed what the appropriate test ought to be. He
acknowledged that the Court had not been clear about the
formulation of the appropriate test. He noted that one possible
formulation of the test might be "whether the practice could be
'reasonably deemed' by the enacting legislature to further a
legitimate goal." 45 He proposed, however, the "less permissive
standard" of whether the advantages to government of the
employment practice can "reasonably be deemed to outweigh its
'coercive' effects." 46
Justice Scalia went on to apply that standard in the next part of
his dissenting opinion.47 While making clear that he was not endorsing
the practice of patronage, he went on to describe the potential
benefits of patronage. Quoting Justice Powell's dissent in Elrod,
Justice Scalia characterized patronage as stabilizing political parties
and preventing excessive political fragmentation. Patronage provides
the motivation to encourage party faithful to engage in the
"drudgery" of organizing precincts, registering new voters, and
providing constituent services. 48
Scalia then chastised the majority for ignoring the effect that
patronage has in enforcing party discipline and the corresponding
effect on making political parties effective, in particular the majority's
claim that the need for party workers is obsolete, given the use of
media and advertisement in running campaigns. Justice Scalia
described it as "self-evident" that "eliminating patronage will
significantly undermine party discipline" and ultimately the strength
of the two-party system. 49 He found the majority's claim that
"[p]olitical parties have already survived the substantial decline in
patronage employment practices" unpersuasive. Parties might have
survived, noted Scalia, but as very different and weakened entities.o
Justice Scalia elaborated on this concern by noting patronage not
only strengthens political parties in general, but that "it fosters the

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

103.
101-02.
102.
103-10.
104.
106.
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two-party system in particular."" According to Scalia, the two-party
system is supported via the effect that patronage has on diminishing
the attractiveness of marginal/extreme groups, diminishing the effect
of interest groups, and helping assimilate new entrants (such as racial
and ethnic minorities) into the political process.52 Patronage might
have the salutary effect of encouraging the parties to adopt more
centric policies in order to appeal to a majority of the electorate.
Patronage also decreases the role that interest groups could play in
politics. Scalia lamented that the Court's decisions in Branti and
Elrod have contributed to the growth of interest-group politics. 5 3 He
continued:
Our decision today will greatly accelerate the trend. It is not only
campaigns that are affected, of course, but the subsequent behavior
of politicians once they are in power. The replacement of a system
firmly based in party discipline with one in which each office-holder
comes to his own accommodation with competing interest groups
produces "a dispersion of political influence that may inhibit a
political party from enacting its programs into law."54
Scalia then briefly commented on the disadvantages of
patronage. He noted that patronage might facilitate corrupting
practices such as salary kickbacks. He also acknowledged that
patronage might create inefficiencies as less qualified but politically
active individuals might be hired. Finally, he noted "[a]nd, of course,
it applies some greater or lesser inducement for individuals to join
and work for the party in power."
Justice Scalia went on to discuss why these concerns, particularly
the last one, are not as worrisome as the majority seemed to claim.
His basic argument was that patronage does not demand party
workers to adopt a specific set of political beliefs, but only "demands
loyalty to, and activity on behalf of, the organization."5 6 Scalia
continued:
[The party worker] is generally free to urge within the organization
the adoption of any political position; but if that position is rejected
he must vote and work for the party nonetheless. The diversity of
political expression (other than expression of party loyalty) is
channeled, in other words, to a different stage - to the contests for

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 106-08.
Id. at 107.
Id. (quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 531 (1980) (Powell J., dissenting)).
Id. at 109.
Id.
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party endorsement rather than the partisan elections.
Justice Scalia concluded Part II of his dissent by arguing that the
framework established by Branti and Elrod had proven to be
unworkable given the Court's reluctance to either declare that all
patronage decisions are unconstitutional, or by designing a clear line
"that judges, lawyers, and public employees can understand."" He
then listed a few examples of the "shambles Branti has produced."5 9
A city cannot fire a deputy sheriff because of his political
affiliations, but then again perhaps it can, especially if he is called
the "police captain." A county cannot fire on that basis its attorney
for the department of social services, nor its assistant attorney for
family court, but a city can fire its solicitor and his assistant, or its
assistant city attorney, or its assistant state's attorney, or its
corporation counsel.

After noting the futility of trying to identify the dividing line
between permissible and impermissible patronage, Scalia concluded:
Once we reject as the criterion a long political tradition showing
that party-based employment is entirely permissible, yet are
unwilling (as any reasonable person must be) to replace it with the
principle that party-based employment is entirely impermissible, we
have left the realm of law and entered the domain of political
science, seeking to ascertain when and where the undoubted
benefits of political hiring and firing are worth its undoubted
costs. 61

-

In Part III of his dissenting opinion, Scalia argued that even if he
was to be convinced that Branti and Elrod were not wrongly decided,
he would not extend their holdings to cases involving hiring decisions.
Characterizing cases involving decision to dismiss an employee as
involving
"an
appreciably
greater
constraint"
than
the
disappointment associated with the failure to obtain a promotion or
to obtain employment, Scalia saw the Court's extension of the
holding in those prior cases as unwarranted.6 2 He ended by cautioning
the majority as to the flood of litigation that was likely to ensue from
cases brought by "that most persistent and tenacious of suitors"
"the disappointed office seeker." 63

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

111.
111-12.
113.
115.
116.
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IV.

ANALYSIS

As this summary illustrates, Justice Scalia had a lot to say in his
dissenting opinion. He covered a wide array of issues including the
history of patronage, his originalist approach to constitutional
interpretation, the use of patronage at the time the case was decided,
the state of the two-party system, and the implications of the Court's
decisions. Any of these issues could be the basis of an entire article,
and indeed many have been written. In this section, I focus on three
issues which I find of particular interest: Justice Scalia's discussion
regarding the history of patronage; his assessment regarding the
standard chosen by the majority; and the picture that emerges from
this opinion about Justice Scalia's view of the public workplace.
A. The Tradition of Patronage
According to Justice Scalia, evaluating the constitutionality of a
government employment practice ought to start by exploring whether
the practice being challenged (i.e., patronage) enjoyed "a long
tradition or open, widespread, and unchallenged use." 64 Scalia found
that to be not a difficult question, as patronage in his view clearly
enjoyed a "landmark status as one of our accepted political
traditions." 65 Interestingly, and despite the importance that he placed
on this part of the inquiry, Justice Scalia spent just one paragraph on
this matter. For the proposition that "patronage was, without any
thought that it could be unconstitutional, a basis for government
employment from the earliest days of the Republic until Elrod,"
Justice Scalia cited to Justice Powell's dissenting opinions in Elrod
and Branti.6 6 Thus, in exploring the soundness of Justice Scalia's
argument, we need to briefly explore the basis for Justice Powell's
commentary in both Elrod and Branti.
The main source of Justice Powell's material in Elrod, which
preceded Branti by four years, is a 1905 book by Carl R. Fish titled,
The Civil Service and the Patronage.67 The book is a detailed
64. Id. at 95.
65. Id. at 96.
66. Id. For the proposition that patronage "has continued unabated since Elrod," Justice
Scalia cited to three academics , DAVID PRICE, BRINGING BACK THE PARTIES, 24, 32 (1984),
Roy Gardner, A Theory of the Spoils System, 54 PUB. CHOICE 171, 181 (1987), and MarieFrance Toinet & Ian Glenn, Clientelism and Corruption in the "Open" Society: The Case of the
United States, in PRIVATE PATRONAGE AND PUBLIC POWER 193, 202 (Christopher Clapham
ed., 1982).
67. CARL R. FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE (1905).
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discussion of the patronage system. Justice Powell argued that the use
of patronage preceded Jackson's presidency and that in fact it goes
back to the practices of the very first president.68 Powell noted that
Washington tended to confine appointments to Federalists, that
Adams removed some Republicans from minor posts, and that
Jefferson, who was the first President to succeed a President from an
opposing party, made significant use of patronage. 6 9 As did Fish,
Justice Powell then attributed the relatively sparse use of patronage
during the preceding several years to the fact that the next three
presidents were from the same political party.70 Also relying on Fish's
work, Justice Powell noted that patronage was practiced widely
among the states, especially in New York and Pennsylvania.7 ' Finally,
Powell argued that the practice of patronage was credited with
broadening the base of political participation by providing incentives
to newcomers to the country to take part in the political process.72
Justice Powell's summary of Fish's book, which is incorporated
by reference in Justice Scalia's dissent, is an accurate but incomplete
representation of that work. In particular, two aspects of the book are
not given, I think, their proper due.
First, Fish's book not only describes the practice of patronage
but also, as reflected in the title, the civil service system. This focus is
more than a choice of titles, but reflects a crucial component of his
work. For example, in the introduction to the book, Fish noted,
The leading words of the title limit each other; it is a history of the
civil service from the standpoint of the patronage, and of the
patronage with regard solely to the public offices. The aim has been
to give fully the development of policy and practice as to the
relation of these two elements of our public life, from the
foundation of the government to the present day.73
Fish then developed this theme throughout the entire book. Fish
discussed extensively, both the practice of patronage and the
development of the civil service system. The first chapter, for
instance, focuses on the establishment of the national civil service.74 In
this chapter, Fish explained in great detail the context in which the
very first appointments to government positions were made. His
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

74.

Elrod v, Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 378 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 379.
FISH, supra note 67, at v.
Id. at 9-28.

174

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol.21:163

account illustrates that while the practice of patronage was known
and had been practiced in the colonies, there was an equally and
perhaps dominating influence of non-patronage appointments. His
description of President Washington's appointments is particularly
telling. Fish contextualized these very first appointments by noting
that the first task of the new administration was making appointments
"in order that the constitution, and the laws as they were passed,
might

be

executed."7 '

Fish

then

explained

that

in

making

appointments, Washington was guided by the principles of appointing
not "only fit men to office," but also appointing "those who [were]
most fit." 7 6 He noted that Washington's definition of fitness included

of course the ability to perform the functions of the post, but also
other factors.' Geographical considerations were important given the
stage of development of the country, as was the reputations of those
to be appointed.7 ' Fish noted, "[t]he constitution was as yet an
experiment; and Washington, who was responsible for its success,
wished it to be put in force, but by men known and respected in the
localities in which they were to serve." 79 That same overarching
concern that the Constitution was in formative stages, led Washington
also to consider when making appointments that government officers
were "sound supporters of the new system."o "That is," noted Fish,
"political orthodoxy was considered as one of the elements of fitness
for office.""
While ultimately selecting appointees he found amenable in
qualifications as he defined them, Washington's appointment
philosophy seems much more consistent with the development of a
civil service system than with a system of patronage. According to
Fish, President Adams followed a very similar approach. Fish
concluded that during the administrations of Washington and Adams,
fitness for office was always an essential requirement, and although
"other qualifications were often looked for . .
these were ever
subsidiary to the ability to perform the duties of the office."82 Thus,
Justice Powell's statement indicating that "Washington tended to
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 6.
at 7.
at 8.
at 8-9.
at 9.
at 27.
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confine appointments even of customs officials and postmasters to
Federalists, as opposed to anti-Federalists,"83 seems to be incomplete
and to suggest that the use of patronage was more central to the
appointments process than what a more complete reading of Fish
would suggest.
Second, not only is the focus of Fish's book broader than what
Justice Powell's summary suggests, but also his analysis of the
practice of patronage in the early years of the Republic makes it clear
that the practice was not accepted without some level of discomfort
and skepticism. Consider for example, Fish's description of the use of
patronage under President Jefferson, who as the first President to
succeed a President from a different political party would have been
the first President to make extensive use of patronage. Fish noted, for
instance, that like Washington, Jefferson understood the importance
of having supporters in important positions. However, Jefferson was
aware of the need to move carefully in making appointments.
According to Fish, Jefferson commented, "deprivations of office . .
must be as few as possible, done gradually, and bottomed on some
malversation or inherent disqualification."84 After extensively
reviewing Jefferson's use of appointments, Fish noted that while
Jefferson placed more emphasis on politics than prior
administrations," "[f]itness continued to be considered essential" and
that appointments were not confined to those individuals who offered
their services.86 Fish summarized his discussion of Jefferson's
administration as follows:
Technically one must assign to Jefferson the introduction of the
spoils system into the national service, for party service was
recognized as a reason for appointment to office, and party dissent
as a cause for removal. It was not however, the sole reason
required; and, as has been shown, the character of the civil service
was really not much changed.
Further evidence of the conflicting way in which earlier
administrations embraced the practice of patronage is also found in
Fish's discussion of the various administrations that followed
Jefferson. During the administration of James Madison,
constitutional amendments were introduced prohibiting the

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 378 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting).
FISH, supra note 67, at 31.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 51.
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appointment of any senator or representative to "employment, under
the authority of the United States, until the expiration of the
presidential terms in which such person shall have served as a senator
or representative."" Fish noted that although the amendment
ultimately failed, and although as a reform measure it was ineffective,
the efforts illustrated a concern with the dangers of patronage. 89
Similarly, while patronage was practiced at the state level, and
while it became much more firmly established by the start of Andrew
Jackson's administration in 1829, it was certainly not universally
revered. For example, Fish noted that while patronage was well
established in New York and Pennsylvania, its practice in
Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Georgia was rare. 90
As this more detailed account of Fish's work suggests, the
practice of patronage has a far more checkered past than what one
might be led to believe based on Justice Powell's summary in Elrod.
Unlike as asserted by Justice Powell, the practice in earlier
administrations (particularly Washington and Adams) seemed to
have been very limited and constantly tempered by an interest in
appointing the most qualified individuals. In ensuing administrations,
the use was guarded. Also, while as Justice Powell argued, patronage
was practiced widely in states like New York and Pennsylvania, Fish's
work makes clear that in other jurisdictions, the practice was almost
non-existent. Most importantly, Justice Powell's account fails to
address the fact that even as the practice of patronage was
developing, there were counter efforts to uphold the values that at the
end of the 1800s came to be associated with the civil service reform
movement.
This more detailed look at Fish's book undermines one of Justice
Scalia's central arguments in opposition to the majority's decision to
limit the use of patronage. Scalia argued that when a court-created
"'rule,' or 'three-part' test,' or 'balancing test"' is in tension with a
"venerable," "accepted tradition," or "landmark practice," it is "the
former that must be recalculated."9 1 His point here was that to the
extent that patronage was well-accepted and established at the
beginning of the Republic, the Court has no role in limiting its use.
Scalia based his finding that patronage enjoyed such status on Justice
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 56-57.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 95-99.
Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 96 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Powell's dissenting opinions and consequently on his understanding
of Fish's arguments. But as described above, Fish's argument was
much more nuanced than what Justice Powell's summary suggest. In
particular, Fish's book provides evidence that patronage was at best a
reluctantly accepted practice during the forming years of the
Republic, and that it was not fully practiced at the federal level
potentially until the 1830s, during the Jackson administration. Fish
also makes clear that even then, and concurrent with the
development of patronage, there were contrary forces, sometimes
taking the form of proposals to amend the Constitution, which viewed
patronage with suspicion and argued in favor of a civil service system.
Finally, Fish also provides evidence that even at the state level, the
practice of patronage was less than fully accepted.
If Fish is right, then Justice Scalia's claim that patronage was the
kind of established practice which forms the very "points of reference
by which the legitimacy or illegitimacy of other practices [such as
limitations on the use of patronage] are to be figured out," seems
less convincing. If patronage never enjoyed the "landmark status"
which Scalia claimed it did, then there is less reason to defer to the
practice as "the stuff out of which the Court's principles is to be
formed." 93 The raison d'etre of Justice Scalia's analysis seems to be
weakened and with it, his major criticism of the majority's analysis.
B. The Unworkability of the Court's Attempt to Regulate Patronage
Justice Scalia also argued that the Court's effort to limit the
practice of patronage had proven unworkable, and that extending the
holding in Elrod and Branti to cases involving hiring decisions, would
make it worse. As evidence of this claim, Justice Scalia listed a variety
of cases which seem to reach contradictory and nonsensical results,
such as different results being reached in a case involving a deputy
sheriff and a case involving a police captain.94 Justice Scalia chastised
the majority for failing either to allow patronage in every case, or
prohibit it in every case. He complained that the middle position
takes the court into the "domain of political science" and likely would
be unworkable. 95
My reaction to Justice Scalia's concern is twofold. First, it seems
92.
93.

Id.
Id.

94.
95.

Id. at 111-12.
Id. at 113.
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to me that the criticism seems a bit shallow to the extent that it relies
on job titles and does not explore deeply the functions performed by
the plaintiffs in the specific cases. There is of course no universal job
classification system for all public employees. Thus, it should not be
at all surprising that employees holding the same, or similar titles, but
working in completely different jurisdictions will be doing very
different jobs.
In fact, a closer look at two of the cases that Scalia cites reveals
that the two positions involved differed not only in terms of titles, but
also differed in terms of the work that the employees were doing.
One of the dyads that Justice Scalia cited involved the case of deputy
court clerks,96 and the case of a staff legal assistant to the clerk.97 The
two cases are particularly interesting because they involved several
employees who lost their jobs following a change in administrations in
a local governmental unit. Three of the employees held the position
of Deputy Circuit Clerks and the fourth held the position of Staff
Legal Assistant. All the employees were terminated after having
supported the losing candidate in the race for Circuit Court Clerk.
The main issue in both cases involved whether the plaintiffs occupied
the kind of policy-making position which justified dismissal based on
party affiliation. In both cases, the court focused on the functions
involved in the two positions. With regard to the deputy circuit clerks,
the court held that although the employees occupied management
positions, "their duties were, for the most part, ministerial" and that
"[d]iscretionary decisions were, for the most part, referred to the
circuit clerk."98 On the other hand, in evaluating the staff legal
assistant duties, the court characterized the relationship between the
plaintiff and the Circuit Court Clerk as an attorney-client
relationship,99 involving the rendering of legal advice."oo Not
surprisingly, the court upheld the termination of the staff legal
assistant,' but reversed the termination of the deputy court clerks.102
Thus, while reaching different results, the court in these two cases
reached results easily reconcilable with the Elrod, Branti, and Rutan
mode of analysis.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101d.
102.

Barnes v. Bosley, 745 F. 2d 501 (8th Cir. 1984).
Bauer v. Bosley, 802 F. 2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1986).
Barnes, 745 F. 2d at 508.
Bauer, 802 F. 2d at 1060.
Id. at 1063.
at 1063, 1065.
Barnes, 745 F. 2d at 508.
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Second, Justice Scalia argued that the ambiguous nature of the
Court's approach and the fact that the Court's decision extended
Elrod and Branti to all hiring decisions, were bound to make the
standard unworkable. According to Scalia, "[w]hen the courts are
flooded with litigation under that most unmanageable of standards
(Branti) brought by that most persistent and tenacious of suitors (the
disappointed office seeker) we may be moved to reconsider our
intrusion into this entire field." 1 03
Was Justice Scalia correct in his prediction regarding the
consequences of the Court's decision in Rutan? A review of the
existing literature did not produce any detailed study of the number
of suits brought by employees involving patronage decisions. A 1996
law review article reports that a Lexis search revealed an increase of
30 percent in the number of reported federal district court cases when
compared to the five years before and after Rutan.1 0 A 2012 law
review article reported more than 300 court opinions in patronage
employment cases in the five-year period preceding the publication of
the article.105 To further explore this issue, I conducted a Westlaw
search using the terms "Patronage and Rutan or Elrod" for the
period starting in 1991 (the year after Rutan was decided) and ending
in 2017. Dividing that time period in approximately equal nine-year
periods produced the following results: 1991 to 1999 (356 court
decisions); 2000 to 2008 (358 court decisions); and, 2009 to 2017 (306
court decisions). While these are just citations to court reports and
thus do not capture the number of claims filed that did not result in
court decisions, the figures do not appear to support the litigation
flood trend that Justice Scalia predicted.
In part, this might be due to the fact that over time court
decisions applying the Supreme Court's standard have produced
some clarity for many types of job positions. 1 0 6 At the same time, the
civil service system which existed at the time that Elrod, Branti, and

103. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 115 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. Cynthia G. Bowman, The Law of Patronageat a Crossroads, 12 J. L. & POL. 341, 346
(1996) (reporting that a Lexis search revealed 226 federal district court decisions between July
1985 and July 1990, and 293 cases between July 1990 and July 1995).
105. See Susan L. Martin, Patronage Employment: Limiting Litigation, 49 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 669, 683 (2012).
106. See Susan L. Martin, A Decade of Branti Decisions:A Government Official's Guide to
PatronageDismissals, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 43-46 (1989) (providing an extensive list of jobs
which courts have held to be protected from or subject to patronage dismissals after Elrod and
Branti); see also Martin, supra note 105, at 680-88 (providing a similar list for cases decided since
Rutan).
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Rutan were decided has continued to develop. Over the course of the
last three decades, governmental units at all different levels have
made changes to their civil service systems, at times expanding and at
times contracting the rights of public employees."o By changing the
descriptions of different positions and their classifications,
government entities can avoid the kind of uncertainties alluded to by
Justice Scalia.
In short, Justice Scalia's concern regarding the unworkability of
the standard developed by the Court in Elrod, Branti, and Rutan
seems to have been somewhat unwarranted. There does not seem to
have been a dramatic increase in the litigation of patronage cases.
Lower courts and governmental units have adapted to the
requirements laid out in those cases, and over time a common law has
developed applying the standard.
C. Justice Scalia's View of the Public Workplace
In a paper published in 2000, Professor Timothy Chandler and I
described two approaches which we argued seemed to capture the
way courts dealt with disputes involving patronage and challenges to
laws regulating political activities by public employees (e.g., the
Hatch Act and the "Little" Hatch Acts).os We noted that both
approaches have been challenged in the courts as infringing upon the
constitutional rights of public employees and that in turn, when
evaluating their constitutionality, courts had adopted contrasting
positions.
As illustrated by the Court's decision in Rutan, courts have been
unsympathetic to government's defense of patronage. We argued that
with regard to patronage, the Court had taken a markedly proemployee view.109 Defenders of patronage have argued that it is
necessary to insure effective government and the efficiency of public
employees. Presumably, employees of political persuasions different
from those of the party controlling public office will lack the incentive
to work efficiently and "may even be motivated to subvert the
incumbent administration's efforts to govern effectively."o An

107. See Steven W. Hays & Jessica E. Sowa, A Broader Look at the "Accountability"
Movement, 26 REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 102 (2006).
108. Rafael Gely & Timothy D. Chandler, Restricting Public Employees' PoliticalActivities:
Good Government or PartisanPolitics?, 37 Hous. L. REV. 775 (2000).
109. Id. at 778, 805-06.
110. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 364 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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implication of this argument is that the public employer, who is in
charge of implementing patronage, can be trusted to use it in a way
that fosters efficiency and, thus, is not abusive."' The Supreme Court
has rejected this view, as well as the notion that patronage serves
some valuable objective and that it is necessary for the effective and
efficient operation of American government. Instead, the Court has
adopted what we dubbed a "partisan politics" model, which views
patronage as a mechanism for political control that has both costs and
benefits.112 Using this model, courts have concluded that, except for a
limited set of circumstances, the negative social consequences of
patronage outweigh its benefits and, thus, justify limitations on its
113
use.
We then compared the approach courts have taken regarding
challenges to patronage with the manner in which courts have
responded to challenges to law regulating the political activities of
public employees.114 At the federal level, the major piece of that type
of legislation is the Hatch Act, enacted in 1939.11' The Hatch Act

imposed a number of limitations on the ability of federal employees
to run for office or participate in political activities.1 Congress has
amended the statute several times, loosening some of the prohibitions
by maintaining the proscription against allowing covered employees
to use their authority to affect the results of an election, run for office
in a partisan election, to solicit or receive political contributions, or to
engage in political activities while on duty or on federal property.1 1 7
As in the case of patronage, the Hatch Act has also faced
constitutional challenges. Defenders of such laws have argued that
limiting political activities by government employees is necessary to
ensure efficient and impartial administration of public services.
Prohibitions on political activity, the argument goes, provide an
equitable administration of the law and distribution of resources, thus
111. Gely & Chandler, supra note 108, at 805.
112. Id. at 805-06.
113. Id. at 806.
114. Id. at 807-17.
115. Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-26 (2012)).
116. As originally enacted, the act prohibited covered employees to "take any active part in
political management of in political campaigns." Subsequent amendments clarified these terms.
See Gely & Chandler, supra note 108, at 779-82.
117. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7324(a)(1)-(4) (2012). Similar prohibitions have been enacted at the
state level. The so-called "Little" Hatch Acts are in place in a substantial majority of states,
restricting in some manner the ability of state and local employees to actively engage in political
activities. See Gely & Chandler, supra note 108, at 791-96.
118. Gely & Chandler, supra note 108, at 803.
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leading to a more efficient and fair bureaucracy. Unlike the
patronage cases, however, courts have taken a much more proemployer approach with regard to the regulation of public employees'
political activities, often upholding these restrictions.119 Courts have
justified these restrictions on the basis of efficiency, impartiality, and
the protection of public employees' interests.
The courts' approach to these cases, which we referred to as the
"good government" model, stands in contrast to the approach courts
have taken in the patronage cases. The "good government" model
seems to assume that public employees, if given the opportunity, will
abuse their positions by placing partisan politics ahead of the public's
interests.12 The Mitchell decision, for example, contains multiple
references to the "evils" created by public employees' involvement in
politics,121 and the menacing aspects of their behavior.122 In order to
control the problem created by this predisposition attributed to public
employees, the "good government" model turns to the public
employer as the solution. The public employer, represented by the
legislature, is expected to control public employees by enacting laws
that limit the ability of public employees to corrupt the delivery of
public services.1

3

Fundamentally, these two models differ on the level of trust they
placed in the public employer to regulate the public workplace
without exceeding constitutional limits. By limiting the use of
patronage except in some specific cases, the "partisan politics" model
places little trust on the ability of government to use the power it has
to manage the workforce appropriately. The "good government"
model, on the other hand, allows the government to limit the ability
of employees to engage in certain types of political activities while in
office. In this sense, the model seems to place significant trust in the
119. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'1 Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556
(1973) (holding that restricting the political activities of public employees is constitutionally
permitted if it is justified by the need to provide efficient government); United Pub. Workers of
Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 (1947) (holding that Congress can constitutionally
restrict active partisan political activity of federal employees).
120. Gely & Chandler, supra note 108, at 803.
121. "The influence of political activity by government employees, if evil in its effects on
the service, the employees or people dealing with them, is hardly less so because that activity
takes place after hours." 330 U.S. at 95. "To declare that the present supposed evils of political
activity are beyond the power of Congress to redress would leave the nation impotent to deal
with what many sincere men believe is a material threat to the democratic system." Id. at 99.
122. "When actions of civil servants in the judgment of Congress menace the integrity and
the competency of the service, legislation to forestall such danger and adequate to maintain its
usefulness is required." Id. at 103.
123. Gely & Chandler, supra note 108, at 805 (citing Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 103).
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ability of government to appropriately regulate the actions of their
employees.
The Court's decisions in Elrod, Branti, and Rutan are consistent
with the "partisan politics" model in that they reject the need to allow
government to use political preferences as criteria for exercising
managerial authority. The Court in Elrod rejected as unpersuasive
the argument that preventing patronage would lead to internal
subversion,124 or that it would interfere with the ability of elected
officials to implement policy.125 The Court was willing to allow the
employer to manage the workplace, but placed significant limits in
the use of the patronage tool.
In the 2000 article, we argued that the courts' differential
treatment of patronage and restrictions on public employees' political
activities was unwarranted because both are mechanisms of political
control and, thus, should be treated similarly.126 When governments
implement restrictive Hatch Act-type legislation, they are controlling
the ability of public employees to be politically involved to a similar
degree as would occur if they were conditioning public employment
on prospective employees' political affiliations. We further argued
that laws regulating the political activities of public employees are
motivated by the desire of legislators to achieve re-election and, thus,
manipulate the political process as much as occurs under a patronage
system. We argued that courts needed to be more willing to question
government efforts to limit public employee' political participation
through Hatch-Act type laws. 12 7
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Rutan and his various
opinions in some related cases involving public employees seem to be
at the exact opposite end of the spectrum, as he seemed to propose a
model that incorporates the worst of the "good government" and
"partisan politics" models. On the one hand, he favored prohibitions
against the political participation of public employees (whether
individually or through their collective bargaining representative),
while on the other hand, he would have allowed public employers to
allocate the benefits of government employment on the basis of
political considerations.
The latter assertion is based, as stated above, on Justice Scalia's
124.
125.
126.
127.

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 364 (1976) (plurality opinion).
Brani v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
Gely & Chandler, supra note 108, at 821-22.
Id. at 779, 821-22.
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position in Rutan. He elevated the practice of patronage to
"landmark" status. He brushed aside the concerns raised related to
the use of patronage, and highlighted the importance of patronage as
a centerpiece of the political system. He mocked the majority's
concern that allowing the use of patronage induces "individuals to
join and work for the party in power."128 As Scalia put it, "[t]o hear
the Court tell it, this last is the greatest evil,"12 9 noting also "that the
patronage system does not have as harsh an effect upon conscience,
expression, and association" as the majority feared. 130 This approach
suggests that Justice Scalia saw the public employer as limited by
political forces, and thus that any incremental incursions into the
rights of public employees do not raise any constitutional concerns.
Not only would Justice Scalia have allowed government to use
patronage, but he also proposed a public sector workplace in which
the employer is able to exercise control over the political actions of
employees. To some extent, this is apparent from Rutan. Allowing the
public employer to use patronage, and thus limit employment
opportunities to those with the same political preferences, already
imposes limits in the ability of employees to express their political
preferences. Justice Scalia, however, went further as illustrated by his
support of the cases which upheld the constitutionality of the Hatch
Act, his support of cases involving speech restrictions by public
employees, and his approach in cases involving the constitutionality
of "fair-share" (union security) arrangements in the public sector.
In Rutan, Justice Scalia cited approvingly the Court's rationale in
Public Workers v. Mitchell,131 and Civil Service Commission v. Letter
Carriers.132 In those two cases, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Hatch Act, finding that the Hatch Act was intended to
eliminate the corrupting influence that political patronage was having
on the political process and public service. Once that legitimate end
was established, Congress needed only to achieve those ends through
reasonable means, which the Court found Congress had done.133
According to Justice Scalia, Mitchell and Letter Carriers applied the
appropriate standard of review given that "a governmental employer
may subject its employees to such special restrictions on free
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 109 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
330 U.S. 75 (1947).
413 U.S. 548 (1973).
Letter Carriers,413 U.S. at 564; Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 99, 101.
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Justice Scalia was similarly supportive of the Court's decision in
135
Pickering v. Board of Education,
dealing with the regulation of
speech in the public workplace. As in Letter Carriers, the Court had
to decide what kind of restrictions the government can impose on the
free speech rights of public employees. 13 6 Pickering involved a high
school teacher who had been fired for his comments in a local
newspaper criticizing the Board of Education and the district
superintendent's handling of certain financial matters. The School
Board defended the teacher's termination on efficiency grounds.
According to the defendants, the teacher's statements were not only
false, but allowing them would "tend to foment 'controversy, conflict
and dissension' among teachers, administrators, the Board of
Education, and the residents of the district." 31 7 Recognizing the
tension between the individual's right to free speech and the
government's interest in maintaining orderly and effective public
service, the Court adopted a balancing test to determine when
government may restrict a public employee's freedom of speech.138
Although the Court in Pickering used the balancing test that
Justice Scalia criticized in Rutan, Scalia cited with approval the
passage in Picketing where the Court recognized that the "State has
interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that
differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general."139 Justice Scalia
also cited with approval a case in which the Court made clear that in
evaluating the government conduct as an employer, strict scrutiny was
not appropriate.140
The fair-share cases provide yet another aspect of Justice Scalia's
view of the public workplace. Fair share agreements refer to
provisions requiring employees covered under a collective bargaining
134. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 98 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356 n.13 (1980)).
135. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
136. Id. at 565.
137. Id. at 566-67. It should be noted that Justice Scalia joined the majority decision in
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006), in which the Court, in a five to four decision,
limited the Pickering test to those instances in which the public employee speaks as a citizen and
not as a public employee.
138. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
139. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).
140. Id. at 100 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983)).
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agreement to pay the proportion of union dues corresponding to the
cost of contract negotiation and administration.141 The issue of fairshare agreements in the public sector, and more broadly the issue of
union-security provisions, have been a contentious issue in labor law,
with proponents contending that such agreements are necessary to a
well-functioning system of collective bargaining, and opponents
arguing that such agreements imposed unreasonable demands on
individual employees.142
In the public sector where the government is the employer, the
debate of course raises constitutional issues. 14 3 Until recently, the
framework for deciding challenges to fair-share agreements was
provided in the Court's decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education.144 In Abood, the Court considered a challenge to a state
public sector law that allowed school districts to agree to fair-share
provisions and also permitted fees collected through those
agreements to be used to fund the union's political activities. 145 The
Court held that a public employer could not constitutionally permit
the expenditure of fees collected as part of agency provisions on
political activities when objected by nonmember employees. 146
According to the Court, fees collected through fair-share agreements
could only be expended for purposes that were germane to collective
bargaining.
Justice Scalia got an opportunity to opine on the union dues issue
in 1991 in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, a case involving a
challenge by a group of dissenting employees who objected to certain
uses by their collective bargaining representative of their service
fees. 148 The Court upheld the challenge and found that "the State
constitutionally may not compel its employees to subsidize legislative
lobbying or other political union activities outside the limited context
of contract ratification or implementation." 1 4 9
The case's historical significance rests not as much in the
141. See Catherine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions
of Compelled Speech, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439, 442 (2014).
142. See William B. Gould IV, Organized Labor, The Supreme Court, and Harris v. Quinn:
Dijd Vu All Over Again?, 2014 Sup. CT. REV. 133.
143. Id. at 139.
144. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
145. Id. at 211
146. Id. at 236.
147. Id. at 235.
148. 500 U.S. 507, 513 (1991).
149. Id. at 522.
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majority's opinion, but in the concurring/dissenting opinion.so While
agreeing with the Court's disposition of most of the challenged
expenditures, Justice Scalia wrote to explicitly criticize the test used
by the Court. Justice Scalia argued that the only expenses that a
union should be able to charge are those expenses "incurred in
discharge of the union's 'greatest responsibilities' in 'negotiating and
administering a collective-bargaining agreement and representing the
interests of employees in settling disputes and processing
grievances."... More importantly for the purposes of our discussion,
Justice Scalia introduced a heightened standard of review, by noting
that the "compelling state interest" that justified allowing the union
to collect fees from nonmembers was the obligation imposed on the
union to represent all employees in the bargaining unit fairly
regardless of their union membership.152
Justice Scalia's reliance on the strict scrutiny test is particularly
interesting because just the year before in Rutan, he had criticized the
Court for using that standard in the context of the patronage case.
Yet, he concluded that regulation of employees' engagement in
political activities as a group needed to be evaluated under a stricter
standard of review.
The understanding of the workplace that emerges from these
three lines of cases is one in which the public employer is in control
and the employees are subject to severe limitations on their speech
rights. To get there, Justice Scalia seems to have taken a circuitous
path. He cited with approval cases like Mitchell and Letter Carriers,
which upheld the constitutionality of the Hatch Act, which was
intended to eliminate the use of patronage - the very practice he
supported in Rutan. He criticized the Rutan majority for using a
balancing test, yet he cited with approval the predicate of Pickering's
balancing test, to the extent that the case acknowledged the
differences between the ability of the state to regulate speech when
acting as an employer as compared to regulation of speech more
generally. He chastised the majority in Rutan for both applying and
misapplying the strict scrutiny test, yet used that test in evaluating
150. See Fisk & Poueymirou, supra note 141, at 453.
151. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 556-57 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 221).
152. Id. at 556. The application of strict scrutiny in fair-share agreement cases came to full
fruition in Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014), where the Court held that the First
Amendment prohibited the collection of agency fees from rehabilitation program personal
assistants who were paid by the state but hired and supervised by the patients. Id. at 2639. See
Gould, supra note 142, at 142.
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constitutional challenges in the union dues cases.
This is a view of the public workplace that places public
employees in a relatively vulnerable position. In Justice Scalia's view
of the public workplace, patronage is acceptable, as is the ability of
the public employer to impose limits on the political activities and
speech of public employees. The public employer seems to deserve
room to manage the workplace freed from having courts secondguessing its actions. As such, a more deferential standard of review is
more appropriate. Public employees, on the other hand, need to be
constrained, as otherwise they will likely abuse their office.
V. CONCLUSION

Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Rutan is indeed an
interesting opinion. To a large extent, the decision is quintessentially
Scalia-like in tone and in substance. Those who admired him are
likely to find much in it that they would like, such as the memorable
jab accusing the majority of announcing a rule that "will be enforced
by a corps of judges (the Members of this Court included) who
overwhelmingly owe their office to its violation." 51 3 Those who tended
to disagree with him will also find support for their opinion of the late
Justice, such as his less than accurate assessment of the historical
record, or his inflated assessment of the likely impact of the Court's
decision.
Two things are clear, though: Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion
portrays a view of the public workplace that is not particularly
hospitable to public employees, and except for the issue of patronage,
Justice Scalia's view has come to dominate the way today's Supreme
Court approaches the regulation of the public workplace.
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